

Untouchable Forces: Restoring Trust in Security in Weak States?*

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Abstract

Many of the contemporary challenges to vital interests of the U.S. emanate from transnational security threats due to badly governed states. Geostrategic politics and resource constraints have rendered large and coercive interventions rare, but more modest statebuilding missions in cooperation with host states continue to offer a potential option to counter these threats. We examine the effects of these “invited interventions” in which host states agree to delegate central governance functions in their security sectors to foreign states or intergovernmental organizations with some authority to reform them. Despite their potential in strengthening weak states, and thus reducing transnational security threats emanating from them, little has been done to test the potential of this form of statebuilding. Changing attitudes is particularly important in delivering effective security because it relies on citizen cooperation. We argue that these invited interventions likely increase perceptions of security where they are directly mandated, but that the limitations negotiated with incumbents in the weak states mean that they often do not broadly strengthen state security institutions. Drawing on new experimental data, we examine a canonical case of invited intervention: the U.N.’s International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). As expected, we find evidence of the effects of CICIG only on perceptions about its effectiveness and other positive outcomes, and these do not transfer to other state security institutions.

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Introduction

In April 2015, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG for its acronym in Spanish)—a U.N. commission with investigative and joint prosecutorial powers in Guatemala—and the Public Attorney’s Office (MP for its acronym in Spanish) revealed that at least 40 government officials were involved in a network of corruption in Guatemala’s customs office, including then-President Otto Pérez Molina. . Guatemala had faced rising crime and been called “a good place to commit a murder, because you will almost certainly get away with it” (Alston, 2007). Impunity, attributed to clandestine and illegal security structures in the state that persisted after the state’s civil war ended in 1996, allowed elites to commit crimes, supported by these structures that could remove witnesses and otherwise impede any cases brought against them. Eventually, an outgoing administration “invited intervention” in the form of CICIG, which delegated authority over aspects of core governance functions in the security sector to foreign actors. CICIG’s foreign investigators and prosecutors involved in a series of cases against criminal structures and corruption were able to help produce the resignation of President Pérez Molina and the successful prosecution of more than 600 others. But how has CICIG fared in improving citizen perceptions of its performance and of other state security institutions broadly, potentially producing citizen cooperation, a crucial component for sustainable security?

Statebuilding over the past few decades has become a mechanism used by global and regional powers to overcome the many contemporary challenges to global security that emanate from weak states. Following the Cold War, the United States initially became the reluctant “world’s policeman” (from the U.S. Defense Planning Guide quoted in Gellman 1992), responsible for conducting many of these statebuilding operations to mitigate transnational threats. In recent years, resource constraints and the legacy of failure in securing Afghanistan and Iraq have rendered large invasions by the United States rare (Gates, 2010, p. 2). The shifting budget priorities of a new U.S. administration only make the downsizing of these operations even more likely (Dayal, 2017). This is only one chapter in a much larger and longer history of statebuilding that has stretched throughout the modern era (see Dobbins et al. 2007; Dobbins 2003; for examples back to 1555, see also Owen IV 2010).

Recent work has identified cases in which states invited intervention to help strengthen their institutions, specifically, “delegation agreements,” wherein host states sign contracts

with international actors to provide state functions (Matanock, 2014), an important set of statebuilding missions that has so far escaped much scrutiny. Focusing, in particular, on cases that concern foreign troops, police, prosecutors, or investigators who take positions alongside, or with authority above, their domestic counterparts (Matanock, 2014), these missions continue to be an option for strengthening states.

An outstanding question, however, is about the outcomes of statebuilding: specifically, does it succeed in building strong states? The evidence, generally on larger interventions imposed by foreign states, is inconclusive. Strengthening security is often a crucial component of these missions, but it actually has rarely been directly tested as an outcome. There is some reason for pessimism with invasion, but it is not clear if it applies to invited intervention. Invasion may be especially unlikely to succeed in strengthening the state because outside actors willing to invest the resources in these missions may prefer loyalty over legitimacy (e.g. Lake 2016). Invited intervention may hold more promise because it is less costly and often performed cooperatively through intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). However, even security outcomes for invited intervention has largely escaped scrutiny.¹

We build on existing work theorizing that a crucial component of strengthening security is improving citizen perceptions of institutions and then potentially their cooperation with those institutions. We theorize that invited intervention is likely to improve these outcomes for the missions themselves because they substitute its capacity and clean personnel for those of these weak states, but, given that these missions' mandates are limited, they are unlikely to improve the same outcomes for the broader state security institutions.

Examining a canonical case of invited intervention, CICIG in Guatemala, we present results from a survey experiment to test its effects on citizen attitudes. The survey experiment shows that CICIG's involvement increases beliefs that cases will be conducted effectively, and even marginally raise related perceptions about CICIG, but they do not extend to other state security institutions.

The scholarly contribution of this paper is to extend the work on international engagement to better understand global governance by looking beyond conventional tools such

¹A notable exception is Fortna (2008), although it examines only peacekeeping cases: the book finds that consent-based U.N. Chapter VI missions appear to be more effective in reducing conflict recurrence compared to no missions, but equally effective compared to "enforcement" U.N. Chapter VII missions (Fortna, 2008, p. 44). Also see (Matanock, 2014).

foreign invasion, but also aid, advice, and training. A small but influential body of work suggests that international actors may seek to replace or bolster domestic rule of law institutions through shared sovereignty (Osiander, 2001; Krasner, 2004, 2009; Lake, 2009; Risse, 2011). But this work has just begun to explore how well such shared sovereignty arrangements work (Matanock, 2014).

The policy contribution is to identify when—and whether—these invited interventions are an effective option for policymakers. This paper constitutes one of the first attempts to evaluate the efficacy of this method of reducing crime and increasing convictions. While scope conditions apply, the Guatemalan experience may have lessons for future interventions that are similar to this case.

1 Does statebuilding work to strengthen states?

Weak states present challenges to their civilians, as well as to international security, directly through the consequences of poor governance, as well as through those of possible competition for the government or government collapse. In weak states, civilians face daily hardship, in addition to the potential for regimes to fall or governments to collapse. Transnational threats also loom. Beyond the spread of the conflict directly, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorism may be problematic for states close to these weak states, as well as major powers more broadly, especially with increasing globalization (e.g. Brown 1996, and, especially, de Jonge Oudraat 1996, Dobbins 2003, Chiozza, Gleditsch and Goemans 2004, Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 2008). Weak states have been a concern since the end of the Cold War and, especially, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan cautioned that “no challenge in international relations today is more pressing or more difficult than that of supporting weak states” (in his comment on Dobbins et al. 2007).

Statebuilding can potentially counter these threats. Statebuilding is a process by which international actors intervene to help (re)build a strong state.² In some cases, foreign invasion prompts statebuilding; in other cases, fragile or failing states themselves require and even request statebuilding. So far, most studies of statebuilding examine its effects in cases of foreign invasion, rather than invited intervention, and, perhaps especially be-

²“Statebuilding” is a term that others have coined to refer to an externally-led process in particular, and we use it in the same sense throughout the rest of this study; see, for example, Lake 2016, p. 18.

cause they focus on broad outcomes, they are inconclusive. In contrast, and building on three recent studies of foreign invasion, we examine a specific set of security outcomes in a canonical case of invited intervention.

Can foreign actors (re)build strong state? Statebuilding can occur after foreign invasion—which has received much more attention—or invited intervention. Most of the studies so far focus on broad effects, and the evidence is inconclusive.

Most work on statebuilding focuses on missions following foreign invasion. Many have categorized at least a subset of these cases as “foreign-imposed regime change” (FIRCs), although precisely which cases count varies across studies: some operationalize FIRCs as cases in which foreign actors are “primarily responsible” for removal (see Downes and Monten 2013); others only examine those at the end of wars (see Lo, Hashimoto and Reiter 2008); and, many focus only on those conducted by the major powers (see Pickering and Peceny 2006). U.S. statebuilding efforts, for example, include Germany and Japan after World War II and Afghanistan and Iraq after the post-9/11 invasions (Dobbins, 2003). Major statebuilding operations, which usually enter uninvited to impose stabilization, can include some FIRCs but also extend beyond them. U.S. involvement under study then broadens to include Afghanistan and Iraq examined together with other “nation-building” operations in Kuwait in 1991, Somalia in 1992, Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995, and Kosovo in 1999 (Dobbins et al. 2007, p. vii). Neotrusteeships, similar to transitional administrations for states emerging from colonial relationships, but in these cases imposed on states plagued by problems, are often included among the latter cases (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2004). These instances of “heavy-duty external engagement” have been most common in the Balkans (Krasner 2004, p. 102).³

The empirical analysis on the effects of these missions, however, produced mixed results. In part, this is because existing work tends to study broad outcomes. Rather than security or other measures of state strength in the longer term, these studies often focus on democratization. In terms of democratization, only those missions designed to produce openness through sustained effort actually succeed.⁴ Studies that examine security broadly focus on conflict, finding *increased* rates of internal and external war with FIRCs

³In addition to these cases, colonial transitions to independence also had varying degrees of oversight (Smith, 1978).

⁴The United States consistently supported democracy in only 25 of its 93 interventions, for example, but, when it did, about 60 percent democratized; see Peceny 1999. Other studies find similarly low rates of democratization overall: 26 percent of the U.S. cases, according to Pei and Kasper (2003), and 18 percent of U.S. cases, 10 percent of U.N. cases, and zero percent of U.K. cases since 1946, according to Pickering and Peceny 2006.

(see Downes and O'Rourke 2016; Peic and Reiter 2011). Major statebuilding operations largely examine combined outcomes that seek to capture broad improvements. The missions, proxied by the presence of any U.N. mission, show little effect on development outcomes ((Lake and Fariss, 2014)). Examining both "sustained peace and continued democratic governance" ((Dobbins et al., 2007, p. vi-vii)), the United States has succeeded in approximately half of its operations (despite taking on the "largest and most difficult nation-building challenges"); the United Nations and NATO succeed more often, including in "Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Liberia" (Dobbins et al., 2007, p. vi-vii). Others estimate that "statebuilding fails more often than it succeeds," pointing to post-Cold War cases, and that any improvements do not last, leaving West Germany and Japan as the only true successes (Lake, 2016, p. 3, 7). Statebuilding efforts had registered "slow improvement" overtime since the end of the Cold War, however, before being reversed by Afghanistan and Iraq (Dobbins et al., 2007, p. v); that is, some periods may hold more promise than others, as integration into Western systems brings domestic populations more in line with international attitudes, allowing intervention to seek both loyalty and legitimacy (Lake, 2016, p. 8). Characteristics of the host states, including high per capita income and ethnic homogeneity, may also affect both selection and, potentially, success on these dimensions (Krasner and Weinstein 2014, p. 127-8; also see Downes and Monten 2013).

Less explored are cases in which states invite intervention by foreign personnel to help develop their security structures. States often request aid, training, and even limited missions by allies to assist when internal conflict flares ("state-backing")—but they also at times ask for reform-based "statebuilding" missions when facing particular challenges (Matanock, 2018, 2014). Theories of sovereignty now posit that it is divisible, so that host states need not submit to complete control in order to gain resources or assistance in reform (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009; Krasner, 2004, 2009; Lake, 2009; Risse, 2011). Internally weak states may be willing to relinquish some of their Westphalian sovereignty to a foreign state or other sovereign entity such as an intergovernmental organization in order to reestablish the domestic sovereignty that they no longer exert (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009; Lake, 2009; Risse, 2011). Existing work defines "delegation agreements" (DAs) as treaties or other international agreements that host states sign to share or substitute another sovereign entity's authority in their security institutions temporarily (Matanock, 2018, 2014).⁵ DAs empower foreign personnel, including troops, police, investigators,

⁵Many are not just signed between sovereign entities but they are also legislated through domestic institutions.

prosecutors, or judges, to clean and commonly also oversee reforms to the security institutions. Foreign personnel always retain acknowledged accountability to another sovereign entity. DAs come in two forms: full, where the international actor receives authority on aspects of governance over the host state, and partial, where the international actor receives authority alongside the host state. In each, the foreign actors gain authority to make decisions about host state citizens or resources, including by reforming the institutions that directly affect them. That is, these missions work in the host states while maintaining its identity as a foreign government or intergovernmental organization.

Do DAs strengthen states? Little work has explored this question. There is reason for promise: among all peacekeeping cases, for example, consent-based missions appear to be more effective in reducing conflict recurrence compared to no missions (and equally effective compared to “enforcement” missions that are at times imposed on states) (Fortna, 2008; Matanock, 2014, p. 44). A set of case studies, however, shows more mixed results—and, again, examines fairly broad results (Ciorciari and Krasner, 2018; Ciorciari, N.d.). In general, however, despite the prevalence of these missions—more than two thirds of all African states between 1980 and 2015 have invited intervention, and many of these missions were DAs (Matanock, 2018)—their effects are underexplored.

2 State strength, especially security, relies on citizens’ cooperation

Security, and especially the state institutions that interface with citizens, are often seen as cornerstones of statebuilding operations. Many missions focus first, or even exclusively on security, because this provides the basis to effectively develop other institutions as well as other desired outcomes for some foreign actors such as liberalization (for a summary, see Schneckener 2011). This priority has emerged for the international community in its policy work in recent decades, but it also develops from early theorizing that extends back to Thomas Hobbes’ work on the essence of the state (e.g. Fukuyama 2004).

A strong state “requires the reconstruction of both the state’s monopoly of violence and the legitimacy of that monopoly” (Lake, 2009). In the broadest terms, legitimacy produces cooperation with continuous coercion, which lowers the cost of governing effectively. Moreover, good governance can then produce a “virtuous cycle” under which cooperation continuously improves good governance, leading to further cooperation, and

so forth. In more specific terms, policing in particular relies on the cooperation of the public. Both strands of literature, then, point to the importance of improving policing. The question that remains, however, is whether improved policing by foreign personnel has the same beneficial effects on cooperation and state security institutions.

The state's ability to coerce, and to provide security, are likely backed by cooperation from citizens, but often specifically conceived of as legitimacy. Considering Thomas Hobbes' argument that citizens subordinate themselves to a sovereign, David Lake develops concepts of state authority but also legitimacy wherein citizens agree to restrict their own rights in exchange for the order provided by the state (Lake, 2009, 2016). To some extent legitimacy is based on trust, but it can also be defined as having the "right to rule," or at least having much of society believe that leaders have the right to rule (Keohane, 2007). Legitimacy can help gain compliance with laws beyond what is expected by coercive force (e.g. Hurd 1999; Tyler 2001); the state can exact further "quasi-voluntary" compliance (see Levi 1988, p. 48-70 and Lake 2007). Legitimacy, in turn, then strengthens the mandate of the sovereign to coerce as well: "because a sufficient number of the ruled accept the ruler and his edicts as legitimate, the ruler can employ force against individual free riders and even dissidents, " which also deters potential free riders and dissidents (Lake, 2007).

Theories of the importance of legitimacy point to its role in reducing the cost of governing but also in improving government through a "virtuous cycle" (Stollenwerk, N.d.; Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009; Levi and Sacks, 2009). Legitimacy follows from the provision of social order (Lake 2009, 2016; also see Levi 1988, 1997). But producing social order through coercion alone is costly and may not invoke legitimacy if repression is used indiscriminately to put down immediate threats, for instance (Weber, 2014; Easton, 1975; Levi and Sacks, 2009; Krasner and Risse, 2014). Instead, legitimacy also develops from the provision of justice (Keohane, 2007, p. 5), which includes characteristics like equality in front of the law (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). That is, if citizens believe governments "have promoted immoral policies, have ignored their interests, or have actually betrayed them," they are unlikely to feel obliged to cooperate (Levi, 1997, p. 16). If, however, these governance outcomes can be achieved alongside social order, existing work expects that the increased legitimacy will then produce increased cooperation by citizens, and, in turn, their cooperation improves governance, reinforcing a virtuous circle (Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009; Levi and Sacks, 2009; Krasner and Weinstein, 2014; Schmelzle, 2012). A similar story emerges when considering the operation of state security institutions specifically. Police, in particular, rely on citizen cooperation to identify problems and address

them. Citizens have a central role in reporting crime, as well as providing information throughout any investigative and prosecutorial processes (Skogan, 2011; Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; Akerlof and Yellen, 1994; Tyler, 2004; Weitzer and Tuch, 2004; Ungar and Mejía-Hernández, 2011).⁶ Citizens need not only to trust the institutions to whom they are reporting so that they feel secure that they will not face retribution if they report crime, but, more mundanely, even so that they do not feel their time is being wasted when they go through the process from calling or walking in a report to testifying in court (e.g. Nanes N.d.).

Theories about trust in state security institutions and their willingness to cooperate also hinge on ideas about good governance and reinforcing cycles. Civilians form expectations about how they will be treated and how their information will be received from their own past experiences with the police and other security institutions, from the experiences from those in their communities, and from any other observable signals they receive from media reports or other sources (e.g. Nanes N.d.; Tyler 2004; Weitzer and Tuch 2004; Lyall, Shiraito and Imai 2015; Lyall 2010; Mazerolle et al. 2013; Saunders 2013; Diamond and Lobitz 1973; Rusinko, Johnson and Hornung 1978; Tyler and Huo 2002). The cooperation of citizens, however, does not only depend on the outcome in a particular interaction; similar to governance overall, cooperation stems from citizens' perceptions that institutions are transparent and procedurally fair (Tyler and Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2004, 2006). Similarly, perceptions of corruption, in particular, may affect the attitudes of civilians and their propensity to cooperate with the state (Gottlieb, 2016). Security institutions, with their immediate interactions with civilians and their mandate for enforcement, play a crucial role in building a strong state, and their own capacity is similarly related to broader ideas of legitimacy and virtuous cycles (Enloe, 1980; Lipsky, 2010; Weitzer and Tuch, 2004; Bayley, 2008; Perito, 2011; Ben-Porat and Yuval, 2012).

2.1 Do foreign personnel strengthen state security institutions?

In the broadest terms, the process of “restoring—or in some instances creating for the first time—that monopoly of violence and especially its legitimacy” fundamentally requires strong security institutions, which are trusted and receive the cooperation of citizens (Lake 2016, p. 4, Anderlini and Conaway 2004, p. 31). However, while a state providing

⁶The same is true of counterinsurgency in places where the state faces active and armed competitors; see Kalyvas (2006); Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011); Lyall, Shiraito and Imai (2015); Berman and Matanock (2015).

improved security would likely reestablish this cooperative virtuous cycle, as discussed, it is not clear that an outside actor can accomplish the same (Englebert, 2002; Zartman, 1995). In fact, especially in cases of invasion, statebuilders may face a dilemma in which they want to maintain control over a state's policy even as the state needs to develop its own legitimate capacity.⁷

In the context of invited intervention, however, two sovereign actors are sharing authority in a state (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009; Krasner, 2004, 2009; Lake, 2009; Risse, 2011). Complete authority and control by either the host state or an external actor are only the ends of a spectrum inside of which exist alternative arrangements (Risse, 2011). In order to account for the rest of the spectrum the discipline's discussion differentiates between types of sovereignty: specifically, a state may still retain "Westphalian" sovereignty—or the government's right to exclude external actors from authority structures in their state—even as other types of sovereignty fail (Krasner, 1999; Risse, 2011). In these cases, especially when a weak state does not have the capability to fully govern, yet can constrain an outside actor seeking to alter its structures to some extent, little theory exists about how these statebuilding missions affect perceptions of the state. In many scenarios, governance functions are shared between a host state and another sovereign entity (Krasner, 1999, 2004, 2009; Lake, 2009; Osiander, 2001), so which actor receives credit for effective security provision?

So far, little empirical evidence examines this question: one study, focused on a full delegation agreement in Liberia, assess the effects on perceptions toward both the outside actor and the state security institutions, and it shows decreased trust in the latter, even as it increased the use of these institutions (Blair, 2018). Many studies do not directly measure the effect of invasion and enforcement in its aftermath on perceptions of the states themselves; even in cases where, for example, studies measure the effect of casualties caused by outside actors on perceptions of those outside actors, they do not measure their effect on their domestic partners (Lyall, Blair and Imai, 2013; Stollenwerk, N.d.). Related work shows mixed results: outside actors invoked as involved in development programs improves citizen perceptions about those foreigners, the quality of the projects, and, in one study, about local authorities, but it does not change perceptions about the state more broadly (Dietrich and Winters, 2015; Dietrich, Mahmud and Winters, 2018; Winters, Dietrich and Mahmud, 2017). In one particular case where the type of aid

⁷See, for example, (Lake, 2016) . Another aspect of an explanation is that any changes made "may be perceived as being imposed by outsiders and hence may not take root," even encouraging states to shift their focus to other areas, further weakening states; see Bellamy 2003, p. 101

signaled the corruption of the government, similar to invited intervention, it did degrade citizen perceptions about their local government, but it did not change their willingness to comply with the government (Baldwin and Winters, 2018). Complementing the study on Liberia, then, we examine a canonical case of an invited intervention, which has a limited mandate, to see its effects.

2.1.1 Untouchable forces

Delegation agreements allow outside actors to operate in place of a state that is weak on security. We argue that DAs help strengthen security provision in the specific sector where they operate, but, given their limited mandates, that they cannot strengthen other state security institutions broadly.

DAs *substitute* outside actors' capabilities and personnel for those of the host state within the limits proscribed. These missions tend to enter with tremendous capabilities in the form of organized deployments of military or civilian cadres—often that already have been working together for the same governmental or intergovernmental agency—with access to funds set aside to tackle the particular issues in the mandate. The personnel provided by these missions are also often foreign and carefully vetted. They thus tend not to have the same potential for corruption as those embedded in the weak state. Beyond checking all backgrounds carefully, employing foreigners mean they often do not have families living in the state who can be used as leverage or otherwise involved in these schemes; they also do not have the same ties to corrupt politicians commanding state security institutions in these contexts. Especially in states likely to adopt DAs, the state security institutions are likely to have been conducting ineffective and perhaps even predatory policing. So, while ties to a community can be a benefit in the policing process, they can be problematic in these contexts because they are not backed by incentives that provide for justice based on fair and transparent procedures. DAs thus hold promise under specific conditions for strengthening governance in weak states by relying instead on outside actors' capabilities and personnel, *rather* than that of the host state. *We therefore expect that outside actors will be perceived as providing better security (H1a).*

The missions are therefore capable and often “untouchable,” but their influence does not extend very far into the state given their limited mandates. Because DAs are established at the invitation of the host state, outside actors receive authority that is almost always constrained in terms of how much it can reform the state. Agreeing to constraints

is necessary because, especially in states that have not completely collapsed, incumbents usually have interests in maintaining as much authority as possible. And, in exchange, outside actors receive “input” legitimacy that enables them to state build in cases they would otherwise not be allowed (Scharpf, 1999; Krasner and Risse, 2014; Matanock, 2018, 2014). Full delegation agreements replace the host state, so their effect is more substantial than partial delegation agreements, which only supplement the state.⁸ These more substantial missions, however, are less common—and often more costly—so this paper focuses on limited mandates (Matanock, 2018).⁹

Given the limited mandate, then, these statebuilding missions can improve security directly, but we believe that it is unlikely that their influence will extend to truly strengthening the state. Outside actors are often allowed to choose their counterparts, influence their behavior, and theoretically oversee reform of other state security institutions. However, incumbents in these states claw back as much authority as they can (Matanock, 2018). Thus, while DAs can clean and transfer capability to the units with whom they work—knowledge and resources, such as equipment and even templates for legal provisions allowing wiretapping—citizens are unlikely to update their beliefs about entire state security institutions based on these constrained changes. In general, outside actors are unlikely to be able to broadly reform state security missions, especially beyond any units with whom they work directly. So, *we expect that state security institutional involvement will undermine perceptions of providing better security provision perceptions (H1b)*.

Given the same limited mandates, it is also likely that whatever positive effects these missions have are limited to them. That is, while *we expect that invoking a successful outside actor will be associated with an increase in trust in that entity (H2a), and may even increase propensity to report crime to it (H3a)*,¹⁰ *we expect that it will not be associated with an increase in trust in other state security institutions (H2b), nor any change in propensity to report crime to the state (H3b)*. Overall, citizens may come to trust outside actors more, potentially enhancing cooperation with them (and, under the virtuous cycle, perhaps also then again boosting their efficacy in providing security), these effects are unlikely to extend to other state security institutions.¹¹

⁸And, of course, invasion provides complete takeover.

⁹This is an important scope condition, though, and, for example, Blair (2018) shows more optimistic findings on transfer to other state security institutions with a more collapsed state, Liberia.

¹⁰However, this is a hard case in which to detect such an increase because CICIG has not actively sought crime reporting.

¹¹An alternative would be that outside actors’ high-profile cases will lead to the belief that there are no exceptions to the enforcement of laws in the state, and it thereby has an “example setting” effect that would increase cooperation in all security institutions (and deter crime). This was a theory underpinning

Finally, these institutions provide a place for the state to assert its sovereignty, even as it is seen as weak, so it may retain its normative functions. That is, because the host state is a partner that must sign onto—and can limit the mandate of the outside actor—it is also reclaiming some of its own control. Therefore, *we do not expect that views on which entity is the correct authority to investigate and prosecute cases will change (H4)*. In part, this may be because norms about states’ roles are strong, but it may also be because of the invitation of intervention. So, overall, we hypothesize that these missions will succeed within their immediate functions to an extent dictated by their mandate—but not much beyond it due to their limited mandates. We theorize that DAs will be able to improve governance where their authority is invoked, but it is less clear whether they will improve governance more broadly, including by obtaining social buy-in that can reinforce their ability to enforce the rule of law, as well as whether any improvements that they have will spillover onto the state.¹² In fact, it may be the case that international authority may undermine citizens’ trust on the effectiveness of national institutions, perhaps by underscoring how corrupt they are, although weak states are still able to project some of their sovereignty.

3 Context for our case

Guatemala is a canonical case of a *partial* GDA designed to state building (see the scope conditions described above). The purpose of this commission was to support, strengthen and assist Guatemalan state institutions responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes allegedly committed by illegal security forces and clandestine security organizations and other criminal conduct related to these entities (A/63/511). CICIG thus seeks to tackle impunity as well as the corruption that causes it. This mandate, according to the international agreement that established the mission, will help strengthen security, increasing the ability of institutions to protect Guatemalan citizens and provide access to justice, and, in turn, increasing their cooperation. In this section, we describe the nature of Guatemala’s weakness in terms of security, the mandate of CICIG, the dimensions of success for CICIG that we can clearly observe, including on the cases in which it is in-

the mission in the case we analyze, where the Commissioner hoped it would teach Guatemala to “see and believe that justice can be done,” even within their own institutions. This, however, seems less likely to us because the state security institutions are not directly changed much by these limited missions.

¹²Even beyond these questions exists the question of how the external actor eventually transfers control and authority back to the host state without losing any gains made during the process. Given that few DAs have attempted this process to date, assessing these transitions will have to be the subject of future work.

involved, its capacity transfer to a unit with which it works, and some very limited success on reform.

Guatemala had areas of limited statehood on several dimensions, especially with regard to its rule of law. While the Political Instability Task Force does not list Guatemala as failing after 1996, and the conflict no longer reached the battle-death thresholds to qualify as a war, the level of crime remained high. Indeed, Guatemala City is among the most crime-ridden in the world outside of the context of war. The violence has been primarily criminal not political (Reilly, 2008). An inability to overcome impunity has made reducing crime very difficult (Feiser, 2010). Impunity ("the *de facto* or *de jure* absence of criminal, administrative, disciplinary or civil responsibility and the ability to avoid investigation or punishment," according to the agreement that the state signed to rectify this problem) weakened the rule of law, which, in turn, undermined trust in the state. Convictions in criminal cases, even major cases, is estimated in the single digits, which allows violence to continue with no expected punishment (Alston, 2007). Impunity was usually attributed to the criminal structures and clandestine security structures that were rooted in the Guatemalan civil war, 1960-1996 (Feiser, 2010). Their reach within the police and judicial systems has meant that criminal "will almost certainly get away with [their crimes]" (Alston, 2007).

CICIG was established through a process that began in 2003. Following peacekeeping missions during Guatemala's peace process in the 1990s, the Guatemalan government requested the creation of a joint Guatemalan and U.N. commission through the Department of Political Affairs in December of that year (A/RES/63/19). This initial body would have been a full GDA, but it was declared unconstitutional in 2004. In 2006, then, the government signed what had been redrafted as a partial governance delegation agreement. By 2007, after its ratification by Congress, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) brought U.N. appointees into crucial positions in the Guatemalan government. CICIG was enacted for a two year period initially, and then extended each time it is set to expire.¹³ CICIG received significant funding through a UN trust fund created for this commission (A/63/511).

CICIG's functions, according to its mandate, are to identify the corruption of the security sector and work with the state to dismantle it, specifically through two categories of

¹³The Commission's period has been extended for the third time until 2019. Yet, recent political tensions between CICIG's Commissioner and Jimmy Morales—product of an ongoing investigation conducted by CICIG against Morales, alleging corruption on the president's campaign back in 2015—the president has decided not to renew CICIG's period beyond 2019.

action: individual investigation, prosecution, and punishment, as well as advice on institutional reform to allow the state to more effectively execute these functions (A/63/511; Hudson and Taylor 2010). In general, CICIG's goals are meant to be fulfilled through capability transfer by working together both on individual investigations and more encompassing institutional reforms.

First, on the individual cases, the U.N. provided investigative and prosecutorial teams that could conduct and oversee organized crime cases brought before Guatemalan judges. The federal investigators and prosecutors that are part of CICIG are not paid or overseen by the Guatemalan government; instead, they are responsible to the U.N. CICIG was not granted full authority to prosecute on its own—this had been a component of the original proposal in 2003 that was ruled unconstitutional—but it did gain some control in the process. In the mandate, the Commission could either present criminal charges to the Public Prosecutor or join criminal proceedings as a “querellente adhesivo,” a co-prosecutor or complementary prosecutor.¹⁴ Once the Public Prosecutor opened a case and admitted CICIG as a co-prosecutor, it had the ability to introduce evidence and file procedural motions.¹⁵ In addition to acting as a co-prosecutor, CICIG also began to train a special prosecutorial unit, the Special Prosecutor's Unit assigned to CICIG (UEFAC due to its Spanish acronym), as it was known until 2008, and then the Special Anti-Impunity Prosecutor's Bureau (FECEI).¹⁶ This team was composed of members of the Public Prosecutor's office and reported directly to its chief, but it was selected by, trained by, and then worked continuously with CICIG. Through UEFAC/FECEI, then, CICIG can more directly initiate and run prosecutions. CICIG was granted full authority to investigate any person, official, or private entity for crimes that it suspected were related to the illegal criminal structures and clandestine security organizations; it also had the ability to request statements, documents, and general cooperation from any individual or entity in the government.¹⁷

Second, in terms of institutional reform, CICIG was also mandated to propose legislation to facilitate the trial of organized crime suspects. “The Commission also has the power to recommend public policies and legal, judicial, and institutional reforms to pre-

¹⁴“Acuerdo entre la ONU y el Gobierno de Guatemala relativo al Establecimiento de una CICIG” 2006, Article 1; Pastor 2011-2012.

¹⁵Código Procesal Penal de Guatemala, Decreto 51.92, Articles 116–121 cited in Wirken 2011.

¹⁶Convenio de cooperación bilateral entre el Ministerio Público y la Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG), February 27, 2008, Article 308 cited in Wirken 2011.

¹⁷“Acuerdo entre la ONU y el Gobierno de Guatemala relativo al Establecimiento de una CICIG” 2006, Article 1.

vent the resurgence of the CIACS [illegal groups and clandestine security structures]” (Washington Office on Latin America, 2015, p. 9). The mandate allows CICIG to recommend policies and reforms to the legal and institutional systems within the state directly to the legislature.¹⁸ Two of the most important recommendations, which have considerably contributed to improve the prosecuting skills and methods of the MP, have been the reform to the witness protection system and the introduction of wiretapping.¹⁹ CICIG is also allowed to identify current civil servants that commit infractions and participate in their disciplinary proceedings.²⁰

To so this work, CICIG brings considerable capacity and resources: CICIG has an annual budget of approximately \$20 million dollars for its relatively limited operation (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016). With this budget, CICIG has hired national and international experts.²¹ Having foreign staff working at CICIG provides a series of benefits that should translate into more efficient investigations. First, it reduces the extent to which the staff is susceptible to extortion and other threats from criminal organizations. As the latest report from the Open Society Justice Initiative explains, “Foreigners did not have relatives living in Guatemala who could be subject to pressure or threats; their personal and professional relationships were not linked to life in Guatemala nor were they affected by the activities of the Public Ministry.” (p. 101). Second, foreign prosecutors bring their expertise in working abroad and knowledge in cutting-edge investigative methods (such as wiretapping or the development of witness protection programs).²² CICIG is therefore also able to employ cutting-edge technology to find and store information, methods to process and present evidence, and litigation techniques (CICIG, 2015b).

CICIG has had many successes in the specific cases it investigates and serves as a complementary prosecutor (*querellante adhesivo*). By 2015, the Commission had initiated more than 200 investigations, involving 33 criminal structures operating in Guatemala, as well as 161 public servants CICIG (2015a). Although we cannot make a rigorous comparison of the conviction rates of cases prosecuted with versus without CICIG to test the

¹⁸“Acuerdo entre la ONU y el Gobierno de Guatemala relativo al Establecimiento de una CICIG” 2006, Articles 2-3.

¹⁹Go here to read more about these reforms.

²⁰“Acuerdo entre la ONU y el Gobierno de Guatemala relativo al Establecimiento de una CICIG” 2006, Article 3.

²¹To date, CICIG has around 148 staff members, including 80 from Guatemala; the rest are from Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Venezuela (CICIG, 2015b).

²²For instance, the current Commissioner had wide experience in Colombia dismantling a network of politicians with relationships with paramilitary groups and drug gangs.

Commission's direct effect on crime reduction, suggestive evidence indicates that cases where the Commission has served as *querellante adhesivo* tend to be more likely to end in a successful conviction. In the first seven years of its operation (for which we could obtain complete information), CICIG had served as *querellante adhesivo* in 50 cases, and, by 2013, 20 of these had resulted in a successful conviction.²³ The last comprehensive data provided by CICIG, up to 2012, more broadly claimed that the Commission had received 2,361 complaints, had opened 289 investigations (more, presumably, than the cases they had co-prosecuted), and had produced 70 successful convictions and a conviction rate above 20%. Compared to the almost single digit conviction rates in similar cases in which CICIG is not involved—up to ten percent depending on the sample—these 20 to 40 percent rates depending on whether compared to investigations or prosecutions are significantly higher.²⁴ There is consensus that CICIG selects the highest impact cases, but also the hardest cases, so differences in conviction rates are unlikely to be driven by selection.²⁵

CICIG has also been able to transfer capacity to the unit and additional personnel with which it works directly. CICIG has been able to develop a productive partner in the MP by creating the Special Prosecutor's Office against Impunity (FECI), formerly the Special Prosecutor's Unit attached to CICIG (UEFAC). CICIG's approach to building capabilities within the Guatemalan institutions in charge of providing security is through "learning-by-doing." In cases involving CIACs, the Commission has worked together with the MP, especially this specialized unit composed of prosecutors who were initially chosen and then trained by CICIG. In doing so, CICIG seeks to transfer knowledge and expertise to local authorities. The evidence is clear that FECI has improved its capacity in terms of preparing evidence, analyzing crime scenes, and litigation (Washington Office on Latin America, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2011; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016). CICIG notes that FECI is currently investigating more than 119 cases. However, there is less evidence that such capacity transfer has extended beyond the entities that collaborate directly with the Commission (Washington Office on Latin America, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2011; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016); in fact, some analysts argue that

²³This is information comes from CICIG's website; however, we cannot confirm that this list represents the universe of cases where CICIG has served as *querellante adhesivo*, as they claim to keep some cases confidential for security reasons, especially those that are still ongoing. For a complete list of convictions see <http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/2013/SENT-20131018-01-ES.pdf>.

²⁴In 2015, CICIG presented new system designed to measure impunity in Guatemala; using existing data on crimes overall from 2005-2014, they estimate a conviction rate of 10 percent. See full report here.

²⁵CICIG's selection rule is to take the cases that otherwise would not result in a conviction and that will have a noticeable conviction (Castresana-Fernandez, 2011), so, if anything, the selection effect should make CICIG's conviction rate lower than the non-CICIG rates.

CICIG's concentration on FECCI—likely driven at least in part by the trust CICIG has in FECCI given its close ties with the unit—has limited the extent to which capacity transfer will extend to other agencies (International Crisis Group, 2016).²⁶ Recently, the MP has recently created units, with CICIG's support, designed to join their efforts in fighting human-trafficking and extortion. However, prosecutors working in these new instances have claimed to lack the technical training and budget to successfully advance their investigations (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 16). CICIG has also provided technical assistance to the staff working in Guatemalan security sector institutions. For instance, after having identified a weakness in the witness protection program, regarding the absence of a well-trained police unit dedicated exclusively to the protection of witnesses accepted into the program, CICIG trained 48 graduates of the National Civil Police academy. The training included modules on interrogation and interviewing techniques, extradition and international judicial assistance, among others. These officers constitute the only personal protection unit of the witness protection program. CICIG has also sought to push for changes to the rules to encourage prosecution, as well as investigation, by Guatemalan institutions.

While CICIG has been successful in specific cases and somewhat successful in transferring capacities to this unit of the MP, at least, success in cleaning and reforming other state security institutions has been more limited. CICIG presented legislative reforms in three batches with mixed results: a “First Set of Legislative Reforms,” in October 2008, included amendments to the criminal procedure law—especially on *amparo*, injunctions based on claims of violations of constitutional rights, which could be filed repeatedly in order to obstruct justice—and to the Weapons and Ammunition Law (Wirken, 2011). Five of these seven reforms were approved in Congress. The “Second Set of Legislative Reforms”, in June 2009, was designed to improve the rule of law in the realm that CICIG worked specifically (Castresana-Fernandez, 2011); it included a new court for cases related to organized crime and amendments designed to make prosecuting such crimes easier (Wirken, 2011). Two out of these five reforms were approved in Congress. More recently, CICIG presented a third batch, “Institutional and Legal Reforms 2015-2017.” Of these five reforms, two have already been approved in Congress and three are pending approval. Based on this approval rates, Congress's adoption has been mixed and accord-

²⁶CICIG has also been focused centrally on Guatemala City in much of its investigations and prosecutions to this point (a critique leveled, for example, in an author interview with Claudia Escobar 2017). In October 2016, however, CICIG and FECCI opened new headquarters in Quetzaltenango, a department that has one of Guatemala's highest crime rates and incidence of drug-trafficking. While it is too early to assess its effects, such a move may strengthen the capabilities of prosecutors outside the capital city.

ing to the current Commissioner, Iván Velásquez, this area of CICIG’s responsibilities has been more challenging.²⁷

Table 1: Legal reforms introduced by CICIG 2008-2017

	Number of reforms	Approved	Pending
<i>First Set of Legislative Reforms</i>	7	5	2
<i>Second Set of Legislative Reforms</i>	5	2	0
<i>Additional Institutional and Legal Reforms 2015-2017</i>	5	2	3

Some reforms on essential methods for solving and prosecuting crimes have been among those approved, but others have been rejected. Wiretapping, for instance, was not allowed in Guatemala before 2009, but the MP and the National Civil Police are now allowed to use the technique in their cases. CICIG developed a stronger witness protection program as part of these revisions, including training members of the National Police, in order to make an “effective collaborator” (*colaborador eficaz*) reform work, as it extended to senior members of criminal networks (CICIG, 2017; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2011). CICIG-endorsed reforms that included *antejuicio*, however, faced resistance (Castresana-Fernandez, 2011; Hudson and Taylor, 2010; Wirken, 2011). *Antejuicio* is a form of immunity provided by pre-trial. The pre-trial privilege is a defense mechanism of the government that protects dignitaries or public officials against complaints that are unfounded, spurious, or motivated by political interests—complaints that could undermine the functions performed by the office. For instance, if a president were to be accused—as happened when CICIG requested the removal of President Morales’ immunity in 2017—the case would not be opened before an exhaustive review of the accusation by the proper entity (which could be Congress, the Supreme Court, or the appeals court). However, due to the way public servants have benefited from this privilege due to a lack of specific regulations in the procedure, *antejuicio* has become an obstacle to the investigation of the criminal acts. Often, during the processing of the pre-trial hearing, the public official or dignitary is not suspended from his or her position and therefore can use his or her influence to alter or destroy evidence, or otherwise change the final decision in the case. These processes, which have remained unaltered, have impeded the work of CICIG and the security sector institutions in Guatemala. In March 2018, the reform to *antejuicio* (Ley en Materia de Antejuicio) was proposed again

²⁷<https://elperiodico.com.gt/nacion/2017/10/10/1a-cicig-presenta-los-13-casos-desvelados-en-su-decim>

to Congress, but the session for the first reading of the document was suspended due to a lack of attendance of congresspeople (failed to reach quorum). Overall, then, CICIG has had mixed success on specific institutional reforms to help investigate and prosecute, but it has not accomplished the reform that is central to consolidating change: the constitutional reform of the justice system. A pressing aspect of this reform would reshape the selection process for justices, which has been described as highly politicized and susceptible to corruption. In October 2016, CICIG introduced a bill in Congress (Iniciativa 5179) regarding a constitutional reform of the justice system containing 25 articles; three of these have been approved and at least one has been removed from the original bill. Partial legislation on particular issues may help strengthen some elements of the justice system, but, according to CICIG's 2017 Annual Report, it continues to advocate more encompassing change (CICIG, 2017).

In terms of specific cases, and even advising some institutional reforms directly related to criminal prosecutions and cleaning those institutions of particular corrupt officials, then, CICIG has made considerable progress. CICIG has at times employed public pronouncements and international pressure on law makers, but it also has created domestic units and helped domestic movements that exert pressure, as well. The most emblematic case was the 2015 protests that erupted after CICIG's revelations of the involvement of the former president Otto Pérez Molina in the infamous *La Linea* case.²⁸ Nonetheless, the Guatemalan government maintains the final decision on what reforms are made and even on what cases CICIG can work, fundamentally limiting its ability to make changes, based on the mandate enacted. Although CICIG was mandated to propose policy reforms and legislation, it was not provided any control or authority in enacting these changes. As a former Commissioner said, "all the final decisions were Guatemalan" (Castresana-Fernandez, 2011). CICIG therefore has had many successes in terms of individual prosecutions and some success in terms of institutional reform, but both have been limited by the partial delegation deal. Besides these direct effects that this reform would have in security, a crucial component of guaranteeing CICIG's success, which would not leave with CICIG, would be to reshape citizen attitudes toward the Commission and other state security institutions.

²⁸See for instance the following media reports on this: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/09/guatemala-president-otto-perez-molina-cicig-corruption-investigation> and <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-president-to-prison-otto-perez-molina-and-a-day-for-hope-in-guat>



4 Survey experiment on effectiveness, trust, and crime reporting

We complement this preliminary evidence of CICIG's successes, as well as its limitations, with experimental analysis of the effect of CICIG on citizens' perceptions. First, we are interested in whether Guatemalans perceive CICIG as more effective than other state security institutions when involved in a case (H1a and b). Second, priming also on the success of the case, we ask individuals about their perceived trust of CICIG and other state security institutions (H2 a and b), their willingness to report an act of corruption or activity related to organized crime to different security institutions (H3a and b), and the appropriateness of different security institutions to involve themselves in this type of governance (H4).

4.1 Existing survey evidence on trust

Before turning to our experiment, preliminary survey evidence suggests that CICIG outpaces other state security institutions in terms of trust. Using time series coming from LAPOP surveys conducted in Guatemala between 2010 to 2017, we trace average trust in the relevant Guatemalan institutions over time. As Figure 1 indicates, CICIG is the most highly trusted, and its public support has increased compared to levels in 2010. The MP, however, CICIG's partner, has also seen an increase in its average trust, becoming the second most trusted institution in Guatemala (among those that the survey asks about).

Taken together, these figures suggest that the MP has been able to capitalize on CICIG and FECCI's partnership to build a reputation that leads citizens to feel more confident that prosecutions (and, eventually, convictions) will actually occur. Other institutions, however, most notably the police, do not similarly improve. We can more rigorously test these relationships in our survey experiment.



(a) Trust in Security Providing Institutions

(b) Trust in Guatemalan Institutions 2017

Source: AmericasBarometer 2004-2017

Figure 1: Evolution of Trust in Guatemalan Institutions

4.2 Research design

To test the hypothesized mechanism, we included vignettes in the survey,²⁹ which primed respondents on the two dimensions described in the previous section, and then asked them to answer a series of questions that measured our outcome variables of interest.³⁰ We randomly assigned individuals to one of the 6 experimental groups depicted in Figure 2, each of these corresponding to one possible combination of the levels of our two treatments.

4.2.1 Manipulating the security institution involved

In order to evaluate cases in which CICIG is expected to take the lead versus those in which another organization is, we showed individuals the following **hypothetical** case about a crime related to drug-trafficking that is under investigation.

Security has been an important issue in the elections. For the following

²⁹These are described in detail in the following sections.

³⁰Survey experiments that use vignettes to prime subjects on a specific issue, have been widely used in political science. Examples include: voting behavior (Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014; Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012), race and politics (Valentino, Hutchings and White, 2002), among others. The purpose of a prime is to “bring to mind a particular consideration” (Mutz, 2011, p. 50). For a more detailed discussion about methodological considerations in survey experiments see Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk (2007).




Figure 2: Experimental Design Voters survey

questions, I am going to ask you to consider a hypothetical case: during an important anti-corruption investigation, two witnesses were found murdered in a rural area in the Department of [state where the individual is being surveyed].

Then, to manipulate the security institution involved in the case, and theoretically the extent to which individuals perceive that the investigators are independent, we varied the origin of the investigating team. As such, individuals received the following text depending on the experimental condition they are assigned to:³¹

Investigators [from CICIG, an international U.N. commission/from a collaboration between CICIG, an international U.N. commission, and the Attorney-General’s Office/NOTHING] suspect that police agents had informed the capo also under investigation about these two witnesses. Presumably, the information the agents

³¹Note that there is one group that is not primed with any entity. This is our control group.

provided allowed the criminals to murder these two witnesses.
The case of who killed these two witnesses is ongoing.
Murders like this have historically gone unpunished in Guatemala.

4.2.2 Manipulation of perceived success

We also manipulate the perceived success of CICIG or the other security institutions involved in investigating and prosecuting cases like the one described by showing individuals the following vignette:

Although hypothetical, this case is not far from reality.
Investigators and prosecutors [from CICIG, the international
U.N. commission/from a collaboration between CICIG, the
international U.N. commission, and the Attorney-General's Office/NO phrase]
have been [SUCCESSFUL/UNSUCCESSFUL] in a number of its recent
cases against criminal structures that threaten the
rule of law in Guatemala.

4.2.3 Sample and survey

We conducted our survey in Guatemala during the weeks leading up to the 2015 presidential election, and it was completed on October 21.³² It was implemented by Borge y Asociados, a polling firm with longstanding experience in conducting public opinion surveys in Central America. All questions were asked in Spanish.

The survey was fielded in the same year when CICIG released the results of one of its crucial investigations in Guatemala, known as *La Línea*, which led to the resignation of the former president, Otto Pérez Molina, and the conviction of more than twenty other high level government officials. The timing means that CICIG had more visibility for Guatemalans, exposed to its work through the news coverage, and, importantly, more local support. Thus, the context in which our survey took place produces two important considerations. On the one hand, respondents may feel especially positive about CICIG, and thus we may overestimate positive effects of this type of delegation agreement. But,

³²We did not receive any data from the survey from the firm until October 26, 2015, after the pre-analysis plan was registered on EGAP's website to record our hypotheses and research design.

on the other hand, we are also making our test hard because CICIG was so well-known at the time—as shown by the sharp drop on the number of Guatemalans who do not know of CICIG (see Figure 8 in Appendix 6)—such that priming subjects on CICIG, and especially its success, may move them less than it would in another context, and therefore we may underestimate our effects.

The sample was designed to reflect the last electoral register as sample-frame. Using a multi-stage sampling process, Borge y Asociados made a first selection proportional to the number of voters per electoral center by department and municipality. Thus, in this first stage, they selected the number of voting centers (clusters) that represents the number of registered voters for the coming October 2015 elections. Within these clusters, at a second stage, they randomly sampled 12 individuals to be surveyed, respecting a gender quota of 50% women and 50% men, and only surveying those Guatemalans aged 18 years and older. The final sample size is 1,200 individuals, which corresponds to 12 face-to-face surveys drawn from 100 clusters (based on voting stations). This sample is representative at the national level. Finally, randomization of individuals to each of the our treatment conditions was done within clusters.³³

4.2.4 Measuring the outcomes of interest

Along the survey instrument, individuals are asked some questions designed to measure our main outcomes of interest: i) perceived effectiveness of CICIG, ii) trust in CICIG and the Guatemalan institutions, iii) willingness to report an act of corruption or activity related to organized crime to different security institutions, and iv) appropriateness of different security institutions to involve themselves in this type of governance. The questions used to capture these variables, and their ordering, are presented in Appendix C.

4.2.5 Empirical strategy

Our first analyses use a difference of means estimator, comparing the means across experimental groups for our outcomes of interest, to test the effect of CICIG's involvement on these outcomes. Our basic specification estimates the effect of invoking CICIG as the main investigator—either working alone or with the MP—on respondents' i) perceived

³³Given that this is a survey experiment, we analyze our data at the individual level

effectiveness of the investigation; ii) trust in CICIG and the state security institutions; iii) willingness to report crime; and, iv) perceived appropriateness of the particular agency to prosecute crimes as the one describe in the hypothetical case. We estimate difference of means using OLS regression, with White-Huber standard errors.³⁴ Since we are also interested in testing the extent to which involving the MP in the case hurts the perceived independence of the investigation, we include an indicator for when the Public Attorney Office (MP, for its Spanish acronym) is involved in the case as well. We therefore estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{i,k} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CICIG_i + \beta_2 MP_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where $Y_{k,i}$ is each observed outcome described in the previous section; $CICIG$ and MP are indicators, each corresponding to whether CICIG is stated to be involved in investigation, and whether the is MP also participating in the case, respectively. Based on equation 1, our estimators of interest are β_1 and β_2 .

Our second set of analyses are designed to test whether perceptions about effectiveness, trust, and authority to prosecute crime depend on whether CICIG—alone or along with the MP—is portrayed as successful or not when investigating and prosecuting crime. For this purpose, we use a difference-in-difference estimator, where we are interested in the coefficients of the interacting terms (i.e., β_4 and β_5) of the following equation that we estimate using OLS with robust standard errors:

$$Y_{i,k} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CICIG_i + \beta_2 MP_i + \beta_3 Success_i + \beta_4 Success_i \times CICIG_i + \beta_5 Success_i \times MP_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where $CICIG$ and MP correspond to the variables defined in equation 1; and $Success_i$ is equal to 1 if subject i was shown the investigations to lead to successful convictions.

³⁴Which correct for different variances across experimental groups.

5 Results

5.1 Manipulation checks

We start by presenting the results of the manipulation check we included in the survey instrument. After showing the hypothetical case, individuals were asked whether they remembered the agency to which the investigators belonged. Table 2 summarizes the results. The first line compares the proportion of respondents who answered that CICIG was the main investigator between the control group and the group receiving CICIG's treatment. The second line, compares the same groups but the outcome is the proportion mentioning CICIG, either alone or with the MP. The third line compares the proportion of respondents who answered that CICIG and the MP were the main investigators between the control group and the group receiving CICIG/MP's treatment. The next line analyzes the same comparison group but the outcome is the proportion of respondents mentioning the MP, either alone or with CICIG. The last line, still compares the same groups but the outcome is the proportion of respondents who answered either CICIG, the MP or both.

The results in Table 2 indicate that individuals who were told about the case being investigated by CICIG were significantly more likely to later on accurately identify the hypothetical investigators in the case. Meanwhile, there was not statistical difference between the proportion of individuals who mentioned CICIG and the MP as the investigators of case between individuals who received CICIG and the MP prime versus the control group. This could be the case due to the recency of *La Linea* scandal, where CICIG and the MP worked together to dismantle the corruption network. As such, it could be the case that for citizens it is hard to separate both agencies prosecution tasks. However, the proportion of individuals listing either CICIG, the MP, or both agencies is significantly higher for the treated group with vignette of CICIG and the MP.³⁵ This suggests that our manipulation may have been weak, which makes it harder to expect significant effects for our main analyses, especially for the marginal effect of the inclusion of the MP in the case investigation.³⁶

Results in Table 2 suggest that while our vignette successfully made individuals think about CICIG as involved in the hypothetical case investigation, it was less successful

³⁵Notice that the proportion of respondents answering "Any MP" is also greater among the treated group and this difference seems to be statistically meaningful with a p -value of 0.14.

³⁶Nevertheless, when measuring the effectiveness outcomes, we reminded individuals about their corresponding vignette. See survey instrument on the Appendix.

Table 2: Difference in means: Manipulation check

Comparison	Answer	Mean control	Mean Treatment	p-value (diff)
Control vs CICIG	CICIG	0.09	0.19	0.00
	Any CICIG	0.3	0.41	0.00
Control vs CICIG & MP	CICIG & MP	0.18	0.2	0.59
	Any CICIG	0.3	0.36	0.08
	Any MP	0.45	0.5	0.14
	Any CICIG and/or MP	0.54	0.64	0.00

in priming individuals on the MP. We thus explore whether this could be the case because citizens tend to associate this type of investigations with the MP or the government more broadly. Table 3 tabulates the responses of the control group to our manipulation check. We observe that the majority of individuals ignored the agency which the investigators belonged to (30.3%). Yet, notice that the MP also receives a large share of responses (26.77%), as well as the government (10.35%). This suggests that the latter are the default institutions when individuals think about this type of investigations. However, CICIG, either working alone, with the MP or with the government, also receive a non-despicable share of responses (9%, 3.3%, and 18.43%, respectively). These figures indicate that our baseline group is already thinking about the MP and, to a lesser extent, about CICIG when thinking about case investigations in Guatemala. This poses a hard test for us to be able to identify and test for the effect of invoking both institutions, although more sharply for the case of the MP's involvement (i.e., the *independence* hypothesis).

Table 3: Manipulation check for the control group (no phrase)

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Does not know	120	30.30	30.30
The MP	106	26.77	57.07
CICIG and the MP	73	18.43	75.51
The government	41	10.35	85.86
CICIG	36	9.09	94.95
CICIG and the government	13	3.28	98.23
The police	6	1.52	99.75
Department of investigation	1	0.25	100.00
Total	396	100.00	

5.2 CICIG and citizens' perceptions of effectiveness

We find that when we elicit CICIG's involvement in the case investigation—either alone or along with the MP, respondents are more likely to be positive about the prospects of the case resolution (a difference that is consistently statistically significant). Table 4 presents the formal test of the effect of our primes on individuals' responses for the questions related to the efficiency of the institutions in charge of investigating the hypothetical crime. From this table it is easy to see that, across questions, citizens have a higher appraisal of the prosecuting institutions when the CICIG is involved (*H1a*). First, individuals who were primed with the CICIG (either alone or working along with the MP) were more likely to believe that the authorities from each one of these entities would correctly identify the perpetrators of the abduction in our hypothetical case (CICIG increases the perceived likelihood in 0.6 scale points). This was also the case for our second outcome, which measures the extent to which respondents believed that if the entity were to try the responsible they would be successfully prosecuted, resulting in a conviction (invoking CICIG increases the perceived likelihood in 0.22 scale points). For our third outcome, individuals primed with CICIG showed a difference with respect to the control group: priming increases support to the belief that the police agents who provided the information on the witnesses resulting in the murders will be identified and punished (an increase of 0.25 scale points).

Table 4: Difference in means estimator: Effectiveness (1-7 scale)

VARIABLES	(1) Identify the per- petrators	(2) Successfully prosecuted and convicted	(3) Police agents identified and punished
CICIG involved in the case	0.580*** (0.114)	0.221* (0.115)	0.256** (0.117)
MP also involved in the case	-0.113 (0.112)	0.0241 (0.112)	-0.142 (0.117)
Constant	4.046*** (0.0808)	4.251*** (0.0835)	4.137*** (0.0832)
Observations	1,177	1,178	1,169
R-squared	0.025	0.005	0.004

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.

An interesting result emerges once we compare the strength of the treatment between the prime that only mentions a standalone investigation led by the CICIG and the case in which the latter is a joint effect with the MP (following equation 1). For our first outcome (identification of the responsible of the crime) and third outcome (police agents will be identified and punished), the effect is slightly stronger when the CICIG works alone, than when it does so with the MP (the difference corresponds to about 0.113 and 0.142 scale points, respectively). The opposite is true for our second outcome (conviction of the crime): the effect is larger for those primed with both CICIG and the MP, although the difference is close to 0. While the coefficient of the difference (second row of Table 4) is not statistically significant, its consistent negative sign suggests that citizens may perceive CICIG as less *corruptable* (H1b).³⁷

³⁷We also tested for the effect of CICIG's involvement in the case investigation on our other set of outcomes: trust in CICIG and the Guatemalan institutions, and iii) willingness to report an act of corruption or activity related to organized crime. However, we do not observe any statistically significant effect on these (see Tables 5 to 7 on the Appendix).

5.3 A successful CICIG and trust in security institutions

In the previous section, we showed that individuals tend to be more optimistic about criminal investigations when they are led by CICIG, either alone or with the MP, although the MP has a slightly negative effect. In this section and the next ones, we explore the effects of a successful CICIG on various outcomes, compared both to other state security institutions and to an unsuccessful CICIG.³⁸ In all of our estimates, the baseline group corresponds to respondents who were primed with unsuccessful investigations with no reference to any agency. Tables 8 to 10 in the Appendix present the results of the estimation of the joint effects our two prime experiments.³⁹

When individuals were asked about trust in CICIG, respondents primed with both the CICIG as the entity investigating the crime and *unsuccessful* case resolutions are less trusting of this entity (see Table 8). And, as also expected, a successful CICIG increases trust in this entity, although these results is not statistically significant (*H2a*).⁴⁰


While the coefficients of interest are not statistically significant the other institutions, the sign of the coefficients provide insights of the effect of CICIG on trust in security provider institutions in the country. In particular, a perceived unsuccessful CICIG reduces trust in the justice system, the U.N. and the perception of fair trial in Guatemala, but it actually increases trust in the National Police. In all cases, perceived success in case investigations boosts trust in national (i.e., the justice system and the national police) institutions but reduces trust in foreign institutions (i.e., the U.N. and CICIG, as previously mentioned). Conditional on being perceived as successful, priming on CICIG reduces support for national institutions and increases support for the international ones. Finally, in all cases, when the MP is invoked but is perceived as unsuccessful, trust for these institutions increases; this effect is reduced when we also prime respondents with successful investigations. Regarding the results for the National Police—another state security institution, which does not usually work closely with CICIG—those primed with both the CICIG and the MP as the entities investigating (prime 1) AND unsuccessful case resolutions (prime 2) were notably more supportive of the National Police, although this effect

³⁸Individuals in the control group were also primed on successful resolution of case investigations, without associating such success to any specific agency.

³⁹Note that the effectiveness outcomes were measured before the prime was introduced, and this prime then helps align respondents' beliefs.

⁴⁰The lack of more results on the positive effect of CICIG (either alone or with the MP) on trust could be due to ceiling effects. Note that CICIG already is the institution with the highest levels of support, which makes it a hard variable to move. See Figures 6 and 7.

is not statistically significant. In general, the evidence suggests these two entities might supplant support for other security institutions, although given the lack of statistical significance, we may read these findings cautiously (*H2b*).



Note: Significant differences are colored in red

Figure 3: Trust in CICIG and the Public Attorney’s Office by treatment status (1-7 scale)

5.4 A successful CICIG and reporting crime to security institutions

We next analyze which organizations respondents report crime to (*H3a* and *H3b*). We do not observe almost any statistically significant effect for these outcomes. One exception is those primed both with CICIG and the MP participating in the case and successful in-


vestigations, when respondents are more likely to claim that they would report to the National Police (see Table 10 in the Appendix). Yet, the interpretation of this result is less clear given that the coefficient for CICIG is not statistically significant, presumably indicating that this effect is mainly driven by the MP. In general, a close look at the responses and the coefficients of our treatment indicators suggest that citizens are more likely to associate the reporting of crime happening at the community level (see the exact wording of this question in Appendix C) to either to the MP or to the National Police (in a smaller proportion), rather than to CICIG. This evidence is not surprising given the more limited presence CICIG has had at the local level and the perception that the Commission only deals with high profile cases (Martha Lucía Zamora, 2018, personal communication with one of the authors).

5.5 A successful CICIG and authority for security institutions

Considering the same primes, then, we turn to the results about who respondents think should play the leading role in investigating and prosecuting the hypothetical case we described (question *CICIG_AUTH2*, *H4*). Here again we find an interesting result: individuals primed with an unsuccessful CICIG—investigating either alone or with the MP—are less likely to consider this entity as the ideal one. However, primed respondents with successful CICIG now become significantly more likely to consider it the right agency to investigate the crimes (see Table 9). An unsuccessful CICIG reduced the proportion of respondents who state that CICIG should be in charge of leading this type of investigations in 13 percentage points. In contrast, almost 7% more citizens than the baseline group (i.e., no phrase and no success) who were primed with a successful CICIG were more likely to state that it was the right authority to lead this type of investigations.

Our next set of results supports the idea that perceived success matters to individuals when thinking about who would they grant authority to deal with crime (*H4*). First, when we ask about which level of government should take care of increased crime and impunity,⁴¹ individuals who were primed with successful investigations but without referencing it to any agency were more likely to consider that the national government was the right entity to intervene (the proportion increases in 7.5 percentage points, with respect to the baseline group). This result is consistent with the responses provided by the baseline group to our manipulation check, where most respondents associated these

⁴¹“If your neighborhood were to experience high levels of crime and impunity, what level of government would you suggest providing authority to in order to deal with this problem?”




Note: Significant differences are colored in red

Figure 4: Authority investigating the case by treatment status (proportion)

investigations to the MP, which is part of the national government. We find, however, that invoking CICIG, given *successful* investigations, reduces the proportion of individuals who would grant such authority to the national government in ≈ 10 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant.

These results suggest that Guatemalans are skeptical about the contribution of CICIG to successfully solving investigations related to crime. Nevertheless, once we remind respondents about successful performance of this task, then they are more supportive of this entity. This indicates that, in some cases, CICIG is crowding-out legitimacy of Guatemala's institutions (especially when it is successful) although in others it may be



Note: Significant differences are colored in red

Figure 5: Indicated level of government to control crime (proportion)

fostering it (when nothing is mentioned and respondents deem CICIG unsuccessful).⁴²

⁴²CICIG has sought to improve citizens' perceptions about CICIG's efficacy. For instance, starting in October 2017 and following the intensification of the tensions between President Jimmy Morales and the Commissioner Velásquez, CICIG established a routine of publishing every Thursday—called "Jueves de CICIG"—any news related to case developments or results of investigations (Martha Lucía Zamora, 2018, personal communication with one of the authors).

6 Discussion and Conclusions

Statebuilding is often seen as a mechanism to strengthen governance in weak host states, substituting an external actor's capabilities for those of the state. Partial rather than full delegation agreements provide less authority to the external actor, and stronger host states are more likely to push for partial over full delegation deals. Thus, partial governance delegation agreements are more likely in states with areas of limited statehood. This restriction in the amount of authority provided to the external actor does have some impact on the direct governance outcomes, as shown with Guatemala's CICIG. We argued that CICIG works to improve perceptions in areas of its direct authority but not beyond that. Examining experimental data, we find evidence consistent with the theory.

Understanding the possibilities, and the limitations, of CICIG is important because, while it is a canonical case of statebuilding by invited intervention, it is not alone. Within the region, CICIG serves as an exemplary case. Honduras has recently negotiated an assistance deal that was initially designed to be similar to CICIG. In 2015, the Honduran government and the Organization of American States (OAS) announced the Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH), which was officially signed in January 2016.⁴³ MACCIH may have been, in part, due to concern about its effects. El Salvador also had external assistance to strengthen its judicial system in the aftermath of its civil war in 1994. The Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups in El Salvador was also limited to a monitoring and advising role. After CICIG, countries in the region have considered similar programs (Feiser, 2010).

Moreover, these deals have been enacted through the Pacific Islands Forum, led by Australia, to deal with similar issues of state weakness in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (Matanock, 2014). But, in addition to these individual cases that have to be identified through extensive research, categories of these agreements also exist. On the policing side, a set of these cases are enacted through Chapter IV or other consent-based missions by foreign states or intergovernmental organizations. These include recent missions in Mali and Libya. On the judicial side, hybrid courts and tribunals, as well as related programs, such as the Special Court of Sierra Leone and the Regional Criminal Justice Initiative in Bulgaria, are also similar. While these missions may have profound

⁴³While MACCIH shares various characteristics with CICIG (e.g., they were both missions invited by the governments to address impunity and corruption), they also differ in important ways. For instance, unlike CICIG, MACCIH is not allowed to investigate cases on its own.

effects on the mandated area, they may not extend much beyond that.

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Appendix

A Additional figures




Figure 6: Trust in Guatemalan Institutions: Survey Evidence




Figure 7: Trust in CICIG and the MP by treatment group (*independence*): Survey Evidence




Figure 8: Share of population with no knowledge of CICIG

B Results

B.1 The independent effects of the CICIG and its success on citizens' perceptions about the rule of law

Table 5: Difference in means estimator: Trust (1-7 scale)

VARIABLES	(1) Justice system	(2) National Civil Police	(3) CICIG	(4) Fair trial	(5) U.N.
CICIG involved in the case	-0.118 (0.121)	-0.0873 (0.118)	-0.156 (0.117)	-0.0710 (0.113)	-0.171 (0.137)
MP also involved in the case	0.0287 (0.118)	0.0372 (0.115)	0.193* (0.117)	0.0127 (0.109)	0.104 (0.131)
Constant	3.707*** (0.0883)	2.940*** (0.0836)	5.174*** (0.0787)	4.013*** (0.0814)	4.163*** (0.0967)
Observations	1,195	1,198	1,174	1,183	1,147
R-squared	0.001	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.001

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.

Table 6: Difference in means estimator: Authority (proportion)

VARIABLES	(1) CICIG	(2) Nat. Police or the Military	(3) Public Attorney
CICIG involved in the case	-0.0525 (0.0333)	0.0275 (0.0255)	0.0250 (0.0353)
MP also involved in the case	-0.0375 (0.0321)	-0.0125 (0.0260)	0.0300 (0.0354)
Constant	0.360*** (0.0240)	0.140*** (0.0174)	0.455*** (0.0249)
Observations	1,200	1,200	1,200
R-squared	0.006	0.001	0.002

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.

Table 7: Difference in means estimator: Report (proportion)

VARIABLES	(1) Report crime	(2) Advice to report not to report	(3) Report to CI- CIG	(4) Report to Attorney Public	(5) Report Military or Nat. Police	(6) Local gov- ernment	(7) National government	(8) CICIG
CICIG involved in the case	-0.159 (0.140)	0.0150 (0.0130)	-0.00500 (0.0258)	-0.0100 (0.0354)	-0.0175 (0.0308)	0.0425 (0.0339)	-0.0300 (0.0273)	-0.0275 (0.0332)
MP also involved in the case	-0.0249 (0.137)	-0.0175 (0.0128)	0.00500 (0.0258)	-0.0200 (0.0354)	0.0425 (0.0313)	-0.0175 (0.0342)	0.0575** (0.0280)	-0.0125 (0.0326)
Constant	3.382*** (0.0987)	0.0275*** (0.00819)	0.160*** (0.0184)	0.515*** (0.0250)	0.263*** (0.0220)	0.338*** (0.0237)	0.197*** (0.0199)	0.340*** (0.0237)
Observations	1,190	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
R-squared	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.001

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.

B.2 The joint effects of the CICIG and its success on citizens' perceptions about the rule of law

Table 8: Difference in differences estimator: Trust (1-7 scale)

VARIABLES	(1) Justice system	(2) National Civil Police	(3) CICIG	(4) Fair trial	(5) U.N.
CICIG involved in the case	-0.0637 (0.169)	0.0300 (0.165)	-0.283* (0.170)	-0.206 (0.159)	-0.310 (0.196)
MP also involved in the case	0.0320 (0.168)	0.145 (0.171)	0.353** (0.172)	0.151 (0.154)	0.210 (0.187)
Successful Investigation	0.0250 (0.177)	0.210 (0.167)	-0.0147 (0.158)	0.0964 (0.163)	-0.146 (0.194)
Successful inv. and CI-CIG involved	-0.109 (0.243)	-0.235 (0.236)	0.253 (0.234)	0.273 (0.226)	0.277 (0.274)
Successful inv. and CI-CIG + MP involved	-0.00688 (0.237)	-0.216 (0.230)	-0.320 (0.234)	-0.278 (0.217)	-0.216 (0.263)
Constant	3.695*** (0.125)	2.835*** (0.113)	5.181*** (0.117)	3.964*** (0.116)	4.238*** (0.141)
Observations	1,195	1,198	1,174	1,183	1,147
R-squared	0.001	0.004	0.005	0.006	0.003

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.

Table 9: Difference in differences estimator: Authority (proportion)

VARIABLES	(1) CICIG	(2) Nat. Police or the Military	(3) Public Attorney
CICIG involved in the case	-0.125*** (0.0466)	0.0350 (0.0355)	0.0700 (0.0499)
MP also involved in the case	-0.0200 (0.0437)	0.0150 (0.0379)	0.00500 (0.0501)
Successful Investigation	-0.0600 (0.0480)	0.0200 (0.0348)	0.0300 (0.0499)
Successful inv. and CICIG involved	0.145** (0.0665)	-0.0150 (0.0511)	-0.0900 (0.0706)
Successful inv. and CICIG + MP involved	-0.0350 (0.0640)	-0.0550 (0.0521)	0.0500 (0.0708)
Constant	0.390*** (0.0346)	0.130*** (0.0238)	0.440*** (0.0352)
Observations	1,200	1,200	1,200
R-squared	0.012	0.003	0.004

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.

Table 10: Difference in differences estimator: Report (proportion)

VARIABLES	(1) Report crime	(2) Advice to report	(3) Report to CI- CIG	(4) Report to Public Attorney	(5) Report to Military or Nat. Police	(6) Local gov- ernment	(7) National government	(8) CICIG
CICIG involved in the case	-0.177 (0.203)	-0.00500 (0.0178)	0.00500 (0.0365)	0.01000 (0.0501)	-0.0300 (0.0431)	0.0300 (0.0481)	0.0200 (0.0376)	-0.0650 (0.0471)
MP also involved in the case	0.0628 (0.200)	-0.00500 (0.0164)	-0.0200 (0.0358)	-0.0450 (0.0501)	0.0800* (0.0443)	-0.00500 (0.0485)	0.0550 (0.0406)	-0.00500 (0.0458)
Successful Investigation	0.0742 (0.197)	-0.0150 (0.0164)	0.01000 (0.0367)	0.01000 (0.0501)	0.00500 (0.0441)	-0.0150 (0.0474)	0.0750* (0.0397)	-0.0500 (0.0474)
Successful inv. and CICIG involved	0.0352 (0.280)	0.0400 (0.0260)	-0.0200 (0.0516)	-0.0400 (0.0709)	0.0250 (0.0617)	0.0250 (0.0679)	-0.1000* (0.0546)	0.0750 (0.0664)
Successful inv. and CICIG + MP involved	-0.175 (0.275)	-0.0250 (0.0255)	0.0500 (0.0516)	0.0500 (0.0708)	-0.0750 (0.0625)	-0.0250 (0.0685)	0.00500 (0.0561)	-0.0150 (0.0653)
Constant	3.345*** (0.143)	0.0350*** (0.0130)	0.155*** (0.0257)	0.510*** (0.0354)	0.260*** (0.0311)	0.345*** (0.0337)	0.160*** (0.0260)	0.365*** (0.0341)
Observations	1,190	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
R-squared	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.007	0.003

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.

C Survey Instrument (English version)

See next page.

SURVEY INSTRUMENT:

For many of the following questions, we are going to be using this card to classify your response. On this card, there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion were between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. [Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].

Now we will turn to a few more questions about the current situation in the country. As you may know,

[BEGIN RANDOMIZATION POINT #1]

[Phrase for A group] Jimmy Morales polled strongly in the recent September 6th election, and he may attract many of the voters from other candidates making him very likely to win the upcoming runoff elections on October 25th. His campaign financing, as the winner, will then likely be investigated by the International Commission against Impunity Guatemala, also known as CICIG.

[Phrase for B group] Sandra Torres polled strongly in the September 6th election, and she may attract many of the voters from other candidates making her very likely to win the upcoming runoff elections on October 25th. Her campaign financing, as the winner, will then likely be investigated by the International Commission against Impunity Guatemala, also known as CICIG.

[END RANDOMIZATION POINT #1]

Using the numbers provided in the ladder to answer, where 1 is "Not at all" and 7 is "A lot," and you can use any number,

CICIG_AUTH1: How important do you think it is to investigate the campaign financing of the winning candidate?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

MAN1: As far as you know—including the information we just provided—which candidate is likely to attract many of the voters from other candidates to win the upcoming runoff elections on October 25th?

(Jimmy) Morales

(Sandra) Torres

Neither of these

[DO NOT READ:

DK

DR]

Security has been an important issue in the elections. For the following questions, I am going to ask you to consider a hypothetical case: during an important anti-corruption investigation, two witnesses were found murdered in a rural area in the Department of *[state where the individual is being surveyed]*. Investigators

[BEGIN RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

[Phrase for Group 1] *"from CICIG, an international U.N. commission"*

[Phrase for Group 2] *"from a collaboration between CICIG, an international U.N. commission, and the Public Ministry"*

[NO phrase for Group 3]

[END RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

suspect that police agents had informed one of the capos also under investigation about these two witnesses. Presumably, the information the agents provided allowed the criminals to murder these

two witnesses. The case of who killed these two witnesses is ongoing. Murders like this have historically gone unpunished in Guatemala.

MAN2: In this case, do you recall where the investigators are from?

[DO NOT READ RESPONSES, just check which ones the respondent answers:

CICIG/International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala

The Public Ministry

Both CICIG and the Public Ministry

Other: _____

Does not remember]

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to again ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, 1 is “Not at all” likely in this case and 7 is “A lot,” likely, and you can use any number.

EFFEC1: How likely do you think it is that investigators

[REITERATE RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

[Phrase for Group 1] “*from CICIG, the international U.N. commission*”

[Phrase for Group 2] “*from a collaboration between CICIG, the international U.N. commission, and the Public Ministry*”

[NO phrase for Group 3]

[END REITERATION OF RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

will correctly identify the perpetrators of this abduction?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

Using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is “Not at all” and 7 is “A lot”...

EFFEC2: If they are identified, prosecutors from

[REITERATE RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

[Phrase for Group 1] “*from CICIG, the international U.N. commission*”

[Phrase for Group 2] “*from a collaboration between CICIG, the international U.N. commission, and the Public Ministry*”

[NO phrase for Group 3]

[END REITERATION OF RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

will try them in *[state where the individual is being surveyed]*, how likely do you think it is that they will be successfully prosecuted (resulting in a conviction)?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

EFFEC3: Using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is “Not at all” and 7 is “A lot”... , how likely do you think it is that the police agents who provided the information on the witnesses resulting in the murders will be identified and punished?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

Although hypothetical, this case is not far from reality. Investigators and prosecutors

[REITERATE RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

[Phrase for Group 1] “*from CICIG, the international U.N. commission*”

[Phrase for Group 2] “*from a collaboration between CICIG, the international U.N. commission, and the Public Ministry*”

[NO phrase for Group 3]

[END REITERATION OF RANDOMIZATION POINT #2]

have been

[RANDOMIZATION POINT #3]

[Phrase for Group *] “*SUCCESSFUL*”

[Phrase for Group ^] “*UNSUCCESSFUL*”

[END RANDOMIZATION POINT #3]

in a number of its recent cases against criminal structures that threaten the rule of law in Guatemala.

AUTH_CICIG2: What organization do you think SHOULD play the leading role in investigating and prosecuting this murder case we described?

[DO NOT READ RESPONSES, just check which one the respondent answers:

The National Civil Police

The Military

The Public Ministry

CICIG

Another organization: _____ [WRITE IN IF THEY SELECT A DIFFERENT ONE]]

Using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is “Not at all” and 7 is “A lot”...

B1: When you hear about a scenario like the one, to what extent do you trust the justice system?

(Read: If you do not trust the justice system at all, choose number 1; if you trust the justice system a lot, choose number 7, or choose any number in between the two.)

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

B2: To what extent do you trust the National Civil Police?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

B3: To what extent do you trust the CICIG?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

B4: To what extent do you think the courts in Guatemala guarantee a fair trial?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

Turning to the current situation in your area, if a typical person in your community, whom you knew, were to witness an corruption related to organized crime, or another illegal act related to organized crime,, using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is “Not at all” likely and 7 is “A lot” likely...

REPORT1: How likely do you think is that he or she would report it?

[1-7, DK, DR scale]

REPORT2: If he or she were going to report it, WHO IS THE FIRST ORGANIZATION YOU would advise them to report it TO?

[DO NOT READ RESPONSES, just check which one the respondent answers:

The National Civil Police

The Military

The Public Ministry

CICIG

Another organization: _____ [WRITE IN IF THEY SELECT A DIFFERENT ONE]

I would not advise them to report it]

REPORT3: Sometimes people have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency. If your neighborhood were to experience high levels of crime and impunity, what level of government would you suggest providing authority to in order to deal with this problem?

The local government

The national government

CICIG

A different level

[If they select “a different level”, ask]

Which? _____

CICIG_AUTH3: Using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is “Not at all” and 7 is “A lot”, to what extent do you agree with the following statement: “The U.N. is helping Guatemalans like me.”
[1-7, DK, DR scale]